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I. MOTIVATIONS
Many companies are connected to the Internet through
several Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This practice, known
as multihoming, increases the communication capabilities
of companies, enabling link-failure-resistant connection, load
sharing and redundancy. In IPv6, multihomed sites generally
have several global prefixes for their networks, which means
several global addresses for each end-host of a site. When
these multihomed end-hosts try to communicate with another
site, the communication can be filtered by the provider edge
router because of ingress filtering (the packet is dropped if the
ISP has not delegated the packet’s source address prefix [1],
[2]). It results in an unjustified packet loss and a subsequent
delay in packet transmission.
We propose to solve the ingress filtering issue in an IPv6
multihomed edge network with the Selection of the Default-
route according to the Source Address (SDSA) of a packet.
SDSA enhances the routing protocol in an edge network be-
cause it takes into account the source address of a packet in the
routing decision. As it does not require major modifications in
edge networks, SDSA is easy to deploy and brings immediate
benefits. Moreover, it could be possible to couple SDSA with
other solutions (e.g. solution providing session survival) to
cover all issues that multihoming rises.
II. RELATED WORK
In IPv4, multihomed sites have a Provider Independent (PI)
prefix attributed by regional registries. Those PI prefixes are
advertised by ISPs to the core network, which drastically
increases the core routing tables already overloaded [3].
Recently, the idea of separating the locating and the iden-
tifying role of the IP address has risen [4]. In some extent,
the Loc/ID split concept can solve the ingress filtering issue.
Indeed, if the Loc/ID split occurs in site border routers,
the packet’s source address changes (rewritten as in [5] or
encapsulated) and can be one delegated by the connected ISP.
Another way to avoid the ingress filtering problem is to
assure that packets going out the site through an ISP x have a
source address prefix delegated by ISP x. Source Address De-
pendent (SAD) routing [6] proposes to have multiple routing
tables in site routers, each one dependent on an ISP prefix. To
be precise, a SAD router chooses the routing table in function
of the packet’s source address. Then, it makes the routing
decision as currently. The SAD routing proposal has two
disadvantages. First, it increases, proportionally to the number
of ISPs, the memory space needed to store routing information
in each router. Second, the construction and the update of
several routing tables in each router is very time consuming;
especially in a site with unreliable links (e.g. wireless links),
which needs regular routing table recomputation.
In this paper, we show that this behaviour can be restricted
at the default route.
III. A NEW PROPOSAL FOR SELECTING THE
DEFAULT-ROUTE ACCORDING TO SOURCE ADDRESS
Our approach to avoid the ingress filtering problem is to
assure that packets, going out the multihomed site, have the
correct source address, regarding to the ISP. In that purpose,
SDSA takes into account the source address in the site routing
decision for outgoing packets, when default-route is involved.
A. SDSA routers
Routers implied in the SDSA selection have two routing
tables. The first one, very similar to actual routing tables,
lists known destinations (site destinations and some specific
external destinations advertised by ISPs) and the next hop to
those destinations. This first table does not have any default
route. We call this table the destination table. The second
table contains all the prefixes delegated by the site’s ISPs.
Each prefix of this table is associated with a next hop (an
SDSA router too) and drives packets along a path to the
ISP, which has delegated the prefix. We call this second table
the prefix table. The prefix table represents a list of different
default-routes, which depend on prefixes. Such a structure
has the advantage of separating the routing knowledge to
the architecture knowledge. Site topology changes do not
impact the prefix table (except possibly for next hop) and
changes in delegated prefix do not imply a recomputation of
the destination table.
B. Packet processing
An end-host in a multihomed site sends a packet to a
destination in another site. On the path to a site border router,
this packet is processed by an SDSA router. First, the SDSA
router compares the packet’s destination with destination ta-
ble’s items. If it finds a matching entry, it forwards the packet
to the next hop and the process ends.
2Figure 1. SDSA routing compared to classical routing
If there is no matching item, the packet’s source address is
compared with the prefix table. If no item matches, the packet
is dropped, considered as address spoofing. On the contrary, if
an item of the prefix table matches the packet’s source address,
the packet is forwarded to the next hop associated with the
item. This next hop, an SDSA router too, processes the packet
the same way. So, the packet is forwarded along a path of
SDSA routers to the border router connected to the ISP, which
has delegated the packet’s source address prefix.
The current routing decision only depends on the destination
address. In a multihomed environment, it can lead to an
ingress filtering issue due to the site topology. In the example,
Figure 1, router R3 is the default gateway of the end-host.
In a classical routing, R3 has a default route to RB . So,
every packet from the end-host to an external destination, with
an α source address is dropped by ISPB . On the contrary,
with SDSA routing, the packet is forwarded, depending on its
source address and reaches the correct ISP network.
C. Network routing evolution
As explained before, SDSA routers have two different rout-
ing tables (destination table and prefix table). Consequently,
SDSA requires the modification of the current structure of
routing tables. To populate these two tables, the diffusion of
routing information needs some modifications too. Currently, a
border router advertises internal routes, some specific external
routes and a default route. With SDSA, a border router still
advertises internal and specific external routes. But instead of
specifying a default route, it specifies the prefix which has
been delegated by its directly connected ISP. A neighbour of
this border router populates its prefix table with the advertised
prefix and the next hop is the border router address. Other
routing information is processed as it is currently done. It
is important to note that the routing decision algorithm has
not changed, but runs a first time for destination check and a
second time, if needed, for source check.
When the routing protocol has converged, SDSA routers
know all ISP delegated prefixes and advertised destinations. In
that purpose, SDSA requires, at least, that all border routers
are SDSA routers and that it is possible to go from one to
another along a path of SDSA routers. Thus, a packet to an
external destination is inevitably processed by an SDSA router.
D. SDSA Analysis
According to [7], the Buildup Time Complexity (BTC) of
a table containing n entries of length k is in O(nk). The
Space/Memory Complexity (SMC) of such a table is in O(n).
Compared to a classical router, an SDSA has two tables to
construct and update. We call k (resp. l) the length of a
destination table item (resp. prefix table item), m the number
of ISPs and n the number of advertised routes. We can make
the assumption that k ∼ l and that m ≪ n. For the SDSA
proposal, the complexity is the sum of each table complexity.
Consequently, the SDSA BTC and SMC are given by:
BTCSDSA =O(ml + nk)=O(nk) (1)
SMCSDSA = O(m+ n) = O(n) (2)
The time complexity of the construction and the update of
SDSA tables is equivalent to current complexity.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
SDSA is a very simple mechanism, capable of solving
one main problem in IPv6 multihomed environment, namely,
the ingress filtering issue. As it requires minor modifications
to the network behaviour and does not increase the process
complexity, SDSA gives immediate benefits to first adopters.
It decreases the packet loss ratio, since it routes packets to the
ISP which delegated their source address prefix.
Further work is intended to focus on the combination of
SDSA with other mechanisms providing multihoming capa-
bilities (session survival, redundancy) such as SHIM6 [8]
or SCTP [9]. Moreover, as multihoming and mobility have
similar behaviour on specific points, the study of SDSA in a
mobile environment is an envisioned perspective.
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